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TAGS: PGOV PREL YI UNMIK  
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: USUN RUNS INTERFERENCE AT UN FOR AHTISAARI  
PAPERS

Classified By: Acting Permanent Representative Alejandro D. Wolff for Reasons 1.4 B/D.

**¶11. (C) SUMMARY.** USUN has delivered strong messages at several UN levels making clear our conviction that Special Envoy Ahtisaari should have the last word on the composition of his own settlement proposal and report. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Europe Director Harland reassured us that an agreement had been struck with Ahtisaari whereby DPKO and the UN department of political affairs (DPA) and office of legal affairs (OLA) provide input to Ahtisaari but leave the final pen to him. Acting Permrep and P-3 counterparts strongly cautioned U/SYG For Political Affairs Gambari against attempting to edit the Ahtisaari report once submitted. Gambari was receptive, but his staff members were defensive about what they saw as their traditional role as reviewers of SE products. Ahtisaari having thereafter privately indicated that SYG Ban had assured him he would have the last word on the report, Ambassador Wolff and U.S. Special Representative Wisner used an already scheduled meeting with Ban chief of staff Nambiar to solicit and receive assurances that there would be no UN-induced delay in the status process. END SUMMARY.

USUN PUSHES DPKO ON AHTISAARI REPORT

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**¶12. (C)** USUN Deputy Polcounselor and Poloff met with DPKO Europe and Americas Director David Harland on January 22 to relay concerns that Special Envoy Ahtisaari's final report should reach the Security Council without DPKO or other UN edits. Deputy Polcounselor underscored reports that certain parties in the UN were expecting to substantively edit Ahtisaari's report. Harland said Ahtisaari had afforded DPKO access to the UNOSEK drafting process for several months and that DPKO has recently enjoyed a virtually continuous presence on the drafting team. Drawing on this working relationship, Harland added, Ahtisaari and he had recently concluded two days of meetings with an agreement that DPKO would continue to provide suggestions to UNOSEK but would leave the final drafting pen to Ahtisaari. Qualifying his comments with an express acknowledgment that he spoke with authority only with regard to DPKO's relations with Ahtisaari, Harland said he understood that DPA and OLA had made similar arrangements. He added that DPA and OLA had been in direct communication with UNOSEK drafters only since January 4 and consequently were providing relatively more input of late than was DPKO. He said OLA in particular was actively scrubbing the Ahtisaari draft in light of UN equities, in Kosovo and elsewhere, far beyond UNOSEK. He said there would be a meeting soon between Ahtisaari and SYG Ban ki-Moon and concluded that, "unless the SYG has strong

views, we can expect this approach will be finalized."  
(NOTE. Ahtisaari meets with Ban on February 8 in New York.  
END NOTE.)

¶13. (C) Harland elaborated his understanding of how Ahtisaari's product would reach the Security Council, employing the analogy of a wedding cake saying that the bottom layer would be Ahtisaari's settlement proposal, the middle his report explaining how he got there together with his final status recommendations, and the top (with the bride and groom) a note of transmission from SYG Ban to the Security Council. He said the goal of this structure was to allow Russia and China to take aim at the middle layer if necessary without damaging the whole cake. Harland then volunteered he had heard through the DPKO grapevine that Ban might be looking to carve out for himself a larger role on Kosovo and, almost in the same breath tasked DPKO Kosovo Desk Chief Marco Bianchini with drafting talking points calling for U/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenn to counsel Ban to respect DPKO's deal with Ahtisaari by declining to modify his report. Summing up, Deputy Polcounselor suggested that DPKO, in keeping with the arrangements made with Ahtisaari, should confine future comments on the settlement proposal to areas in it that Ahtisaari himself changes after consulting with the parties and should have no suggestions on Ahtisaari's report after its submission to the SYG. Harland agreed.

P-3 PERMREPS PUSH DPA

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¶14. (C) On January 24, Acting Permrep and P-3 counterparts met U/SYG for Political Affairs Gambari and laid down a clear marker that DPA, and ultimately Ban, should fall in line behind Ahtisaari, endorse his approach, and transmit the Ahtisaari plan untouched to the Security Council according to

the current timeline. Gambari was receptive, but his staff indicated the UN had questions about its role and commented that Russia was advocating that all involved should wait at least until there is a new government in Belgrade with which to discuss the settlement proposal. The P-3 responded that if UN officials had questions or concerns, they should share them with Ahtisaari before his proposal and report are in final. Responding to a Gambari staffer's suggestion that the EU might not speak with one voice on Kosovo policy, the French Charge stated decisively that the EU would be united in support of Ahtisaari's plan in both substance and timing and sharply told the staffers that he did not want the Secretariat sowing disunity with any ideas that drifted away

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Ahtisaari's approach. The P-3 also rebutted concerns about timing, underscoring that the Secretariat should not fall into the "Moscow trap" that alleges that the issue is essentially timing and can be resolved by slowing down the pace. The P-3 said that any slow-down could enhance the prospect of violence.

USG PUSHES SYG's CHIEF OF STAFF

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¶15. (C) On January 31, Ambassador Wolff and Ambassador Wisner, the Secretary's Special Representative to the Kosovo Status Talks, met U/SYG Vijay Nambiar, the SYG's chief of staff. Having been informed just before the meeting that SYG Ban had assured Ahtisaari that he would have the final word on his own report, the ambassadors shifted the meeting's focus to the endgame of the status process and several potential problems. Noting that Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica had refused to meet with Ahtisaari to receive his settlement proposal even though the PM continued to meet with visiting European officials, Ambassador Wisner warned that Belgrade might not engage with Ahtisaari at all in February. Wisner said we should also be prepared for ambiguity from Moscow in that the Russians seem to have not yet made up their minds what to do on Kosovo. The U.S., he said, was

telling Russia clearly that we have been in this negotiation together since the beginning and want to finish it with them. Nambiar signaled understanding of these points. His aide said China and other Security Council members might try to hide behind the Russians and that "the European position needs to be solid to prevent any problems." Ambassadors Wolff and Wisner concurred with Wisner noting that "the European resolve I am seeing is as strong as I have witnessed on any issue." Wisner also argued that the time frame was important as delay risked more violence. Nambiar agreed it would be best to move quickly. Wisner said SRSG Rucker and UNMIK would need full backing from the Secretariat to fashion a successful ending in Kosovo for the UN system. Nambiar's aide said the SYG and Ahtisaari would need to discuss when Ahtisaari's package should be taken to the Security Council but that it should be soon, probably by "the end of February or early March."

¶6. (C) COMMENT. We are somewhat comforted that DPKO seems to have found a reasonable procedural way forward with Ahtisaari, although our soundings indicate some DPKO officials continue to pursue personal agendas on Kosovo, and we aren't fully satisfied that Harland has his whole division singing from the same sheet of music. Similarly at DPA, Gambari is saying the right things, but his staff seems inclined to begin walking his words back almost as soon as he utters them. Nambiar seems to be on board, but we won't rest easy until we hear Ban, still on travel, expressly adopt the Kosovo process and timeline Ahtisaari envisages.

WOLFF